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DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS AND THE EROSION OF CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
DAVID M. UHLMANN ∗
On April 5, 2010, a massive explosion killed twenty-nine miners
at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine near Montcoal, West Virginia. 1 Following the explosion, President Barack Obama vowed that
the U.S. Department of Labor would conduct “the most thorough
and comprehensive investigation possible” and work with the U.S.
Department of Justice (“Justice Department” or the “Department”) to
2
address any criminal violations. Later in the month, the President
and Vice President flew to West Virginia to eulogize the victims and
3
comfort their families. It was the nation’s worst coal mining disaster
4
in forty years.
The tragic loss of life at the Upper Big Branch mine was not an
5
accident. After a twenty-month investigation, the Mine Safety and
Copyright © 2013 by David M. Uhlmann.
∗
Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice and Director of the Environmental Law and
Policy Program, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Rena Steinzor and
the participants at the 2012 Ward Kershaw Symposium, “Too Big to Jail: The Roadblocks
to Regulatory Enforcement,” at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. I also benefited immensely from the perspectives of my fellow panelists at the Corporate Crime Reporter’s conference “Neither Admit Nor Deny: Corporate Crime in the Age
of Deferred Prosecutions, Consent Decrees, Whistleblowers, and Monitors” (National
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1. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION, FATAL UNDERGROUND MINE EXPLOSION, APRIL 5, 2010, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter MSHA REPORT].
2. Id.; see also Ian Urbina, No Survivors Found After West Virginia Mine Disaster, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at A1.
3. See Peter Baker, A Time for Farewells, Tearful Reminiscences and Promises of Change,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A11 (describing President Obama’s eulogy for the miners lost
at Upper Big Branch mine).
4. Urbina, supra note 2; Ken Ward Jr. & Andrew Clevenger, Last Four Big Branch Miners Found Dead, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 9, 2010, available at wvgazette.com/News/montcoal/201004090857.
5. See MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that the root causes of the explosion
were Massey’s unlawful policies and practices).
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Health Administration (“MSHA”) determined that the workers died
because of a methane and coal dust explosion at the Upper Big
6
Branch mine that was “entirely preventable.” The MSHA identified
7
8
over 300 violations of the Mine Safety and Health Act at the Upper
Big Branch mine, including nine flagrant violations that contributed
9
to the explosion. Without any of the hedging often found in safety
investigations, MSHA concluded that Massey’s “unlawful policies and
practices . . . were the root cause” of the Upper Big Branch mine
10
tragedy.
To those familiar with Massey’s safety and environmental record,
the MSHA findings came as no surprise. In October 2000, a coal slurry impoundment breached at a Massey facility in Martin County, Kentucky, causing 250 million gallons of toxic sludge to ooze into the Big
Sandy River and polluting surrounding water sources with debris and
11
coal dust. The spill was more than twenty times the volume of the
12
Exxon Valdez oil spill and contaminated 100 miles of rivers. In January 2008, Massey paid a then-record $20 million in civil penalties for
thousands of violations of the Clean Water Act committed between
13
January 2000 and December 2006. At the Upper Big Branch mine,
Massey had a methane explosion in 1997, and near misses in 2003
and 2004, because the company repeatedly “mined into a fault zone
14
that was a reservoir and conduit for methane.”
Yet despite Massey’s poor safety and environmental record, the
Upper Big Branch mining disaster stood out as a shocking example of
corporate lawlessness. Massey routinely provided employees advance
notice of MSHA inspections at the Upper Big Branch mine, which is a
15
federal crime, so that safety violations could be concealed from in6. Id.
7. Id. at 9.
8. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965 (2006).
9. MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 9.
10. Id. at 2.
11. A River of Goo on the Loose; 250 Million Gallons of Coal Slurry Oozing in Eastern Ky.,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2000, at A2.
12. Peter T. Kilborn, A Torrent of Sludge Muddies a Town’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
2000, at A1.
13. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Massey Energy to Pay Largest Civil Penalty
Ever for Water Permit Violations (Jan. 17, 2008); Ken Ward, Jr., Fines to Force Change, Feds
Say; $20M Penalty Against Massey in Settlement, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 2008, at P1A.
Massey was also a leading proponent of the practice known as “mountaintop mining,”
which involves stripping mountaintops of trees, soil, and rock to make mining operations
more efficient. See, e.g., Dan Barry, As Mountaintops Fall, a Coal Town Vanishes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2011, at A1.
14. MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
15. 30 U.S.C. § 820(e) (2006).
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16

spectors. Massey intimidated its workers so that they would not re17
port safety and health violations to MSHA. The company also kept
two sets of books at the Upper Big Branch mine—perhaps the most
egregious evidence of criminal intent in regulatory cases—one for internal use that noted violations and one for safety inspectors that did
18
not.
The MSHA found that the Upper Big Branch tragedy occurred
because Massey allowed unsafe working conditions to persist, and because it ignored other safety measures that would have prevented the
19
explosion and the resulting loss of life. Methane was released into
the mine because Massey mined in a fault zone that it knew had re20
leased methane in the past. Methane accumulated and became explosive because Massey failed to provide adequate ventilation or roof
21
control in the mine. The methane subsequently ignited because
Massey used a shearing device that was missing seven water spray nozzles and therefore did not have adequate water pressure to move me22
thane away from the shearer and prevent sparking. Further, Massey
allowed dangerous levels of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust to
accumulate over the days, weeks, and months leading up to the explosion, providing an enormous fuel source for the deadly blast that
23
killed miners nearly a mile from the methane release and ignition.
The Upper Big Branch mine disaster cried out for criminal prosecution under the Mine Safety and Health Act, both for the willful violations of the Act that caused the explosion and the resulting worker
deaths, and for the advance notice of safety inspections that sought to
24
conceal the hundreds of safety violations at the mine. The tragedy
also provided a textbook example of a conspiracy to defraud the
25
26
United States and to obstruct the due administration of justice, be16. MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–6.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 6–8.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6–7.
23. Id. at 7–8.
24. See 30 U.S.C. § 820 (d) (2006) (willful violations of mine safety regulations); 30
U.S.C. § 820 (e) (advance notice of inspections).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); cf. United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957) (upholding convictions of conspiracy to defraud the Treasury Department through tax evasion and fraud).
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006) (concerning obstruction of proceedings before
departments, agencies, and committees); 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006) (concerning obstruction, alteration, or falsification of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy).
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cause of Massey’s efforts to thwart the government’s mine safety regulations.
The Justice Department indicted the head of security at the Upper Big Branch mine for lying about the practice of giving advance
27
notice of inspections and attempting to destroy evidence. The Justice Department also charged the mine superintendent at the Upper
Big Branch mine with conspiracy to violate the federal government’s
mine safety laws for his role in allowing rampant safety violations at
28
29
the mine. Both defendants have received prison sentences. In addition, a third Massey official, who was the top official at another Massey mine, has been charged with conspiracy to defraud the United
30
States, which suggests that the criminal activity that caused the Upper Big Branch tragedy extended to other Massey facilities. Since two
Massey officials entered plea agreements that required their coopera31
tion in the investigation, it is possible that other individuals also will
be charged.
The prosecution of Massey officials for the Upper Big Branch
tragedy and for crimes committed at other Massey facilities is a positive development. If corporate officials at Massey or other companies
are considering similar conduct in the future, they will know they
could go to jail for putting the lives of mine workers at risk, just as
other white collar criminals face the possibility of jail time for their
crimes. Corporate officials are more likely to refuse to engage in
criminal activity and less likely to discount the risk of getting caught
when the consequence is a loss of personal freedom, as opposed to
32
financial penalties. There is no better deterrent to corporate crime

27. Ken Ward, Jr., UBB Security Chief Charged with Lying, Destroying Files, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 2011, available at http://wvgazette.com/News/201102280915.
28. Ken Ward, Jr., Super at UBB Mine Charged by Feds, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 23,
2012, at P1A.
29. Ken Ward, Jr., UBB Disaster; Mine Official Gets 21 Months Superintendent Violated Safety Regulations, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 2013, at P1A; Ken Ward, Jr., Upper Big Branch
Disaster Conviction of Massey Official for Lying, Obstruction Is Upheld, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Dec. 15, 2012, at P2A.
30. Jess Bidgood, Ex-Official Is Charged After Deaths at Coal Mine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2012, at A20.
31. Ken Ward, Jr., Massey Official Cooperating as Probe Widens, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Nov. 29, 2012, at P1A; Ken Ward, Jr., UBB Superintendent to Plead Guilty, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 2012, at P8A.
32. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental
Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1443 (2011) [hereinafter Uhlmann,
After the Spill] (explaining that “[c]orporate officials are more likely to comply with the law
when they fear that they may go to jail if their violations are discovered,” and noting that
monetary fines are not as great a deterrent as prison sentences).
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than the realization that criminal activity could result in incarceration.
The most effective way to combat corporate crime, however, is to
prosecute the individuals who committed the offenses and the companies involved. The law on corporate liability is well established in
the United States, making clear that corporations are criminally responsible for the criminal acts of their employees committed within
33
the scope of their employment. While employees may commit violations for personal reasons, corporate liability is imposed when they
34
act, at least in part, to benefit the corporation. Moreover, corporate
crime often occurs because the companies involved lack adequate
management structures to prevent wrongdoing. Prosecution of corporations ensures that criminal activity is punished and deterred, that
structural reforms occur to promote future compliance efforts, and
that corporate lawlessness like Massey’s receives the societal condem35
nation it deserves.
It is hard to imagine a case in the last decade where corporate
criminal prosecution was more warranted than the Upper Big Branch
mining disaster. The nature and seriousness of the violations could
not have been greater: Massey’s willful violations of federal mine safety laws resulted in twenty-nine deaths and the worst mining disaster in
the United States in more than forty years. On that basis alone, criminal prosecution would have been warranted. Massey also engaged in
a deliberate, long-standing, and deceitful effort to thwart the mine
33. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (holding that the
conduct of an employee “while exercising the authority delegated to him” can be attributed to his employer, upon whom penalties can be imposed); United States v. Hilton Hotels,
467 F.2d 1000, 1004–06 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that the criminal liability of an employer
for the acts of its employees within the scope of their employment can be either express or
implied); cf. United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F 2d. 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding the “collective knowledge” doctrine in the realm of corporate criminal liability, which
attributes the knowledge of all a corporation’s employees and agents to the corporation as
an entity).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d. 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that an
employee acts within the scope of employment if “acts are motivated—at least in part—by
the intent to benefit the corporation”); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc. 770
F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming a conviction despite claim that employee acted for
his own benefit because employee acted at least in part to benefit the corporation).
35. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 854–59
(2007) [hereinafter Garrett, Structural Reform] (explaining how the prosecution of entire
agencies can lead to agreements that include increased corporate compliance with federal
regulations); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609, 618–22 (1998) (explaining the role of expression of societal condemnation in
the criminal prosecution of corporations); Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra note 32, at 1452–
53 (discussing societal condemnation that comes from corporate prosecutions and noting
the relation between criminal prosecution and deterrence).
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safety laws that were enacted to prevent exactly this kind of tragedy.
Even without the worker deaths, it would have been appropriate to
prosecute Massey for its false and misleading conduct and its efforts to
36
undermine safety.
Instead, on the same day that MSHA issued a 972-page investigative report that lay bare the lawlessness that occurred within Massey,
the Justice Department announced that it was entering a nonprosecution agreement with the new owners of Massey and therefore
37
would not bring criminal charges against the company. The United
States Attorney justified the non-prosecution because Massey’s new
owners had agreed to enhance its compliance programs and described the non-prosecution agreement as “the largest-ever resolution
38
in a criminal investigation of a mine disaster.” But there was no mistaking the outcome: there would be no criminal charges brought
against Massey, no guilty plea or admission of liability by Massey, and
no sentencing hearing where the families of the victims could address
the court about their suffering, as victims have a right to do under the
39
Crime Victim’s Rights Act of 1984.
I have written elsewhere that the Justice Department did not live
40
up to its name when it agreed not to prosecute Massey for its crimes.
The failure to prosecute Massey sent a terrible message about how our
society views corporate misconduct and sowed doubts about the Justice Department’s commitment to address corporate crime. As a former federal prosecutor, I supervised or handled hundreds of corporate criminal prosecutions that, while serious, did not involve the trag36. Other factors also warranted prosecution of Massey. The violations at the Upper
Big Branch mine were pervasive—there were over 300 violations at the mine unrelated to
the explosion, according to the MSHA report. MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Massey
and its subsidiaries committed similar violations at other mines and were responsible for
egregious environmental violations too, making clear that this was not the conduct of one
Massey subsidiary or rogue Massey employees. Massey did not have an effective compliance program in place at Upper Big Branch: it threatened workers when they reported
safety violations. See MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. In addition, senior management at
Massey-owned mines threatened workers and punished those who made safety corrections.
Id. On one occasion when production was halted to address safety issues at Upper Big
Branch, the president of the Massey subsidiary that operated the mine reportedly stated,
“If you don’t start running coal up there, I’m going to bring the whole crew outside and
get rid of every one of you.” Id.
37. David M. Uhlmann, For 29 Dead Miners, No Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at A25
[hereinafter Uhlmann, No Justice].
38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alpha Natural Resources Inc. and Department
of Justice Reach $209 Million Agreement Related to Upper Big Branch Mine Explosion
(Dec. 6, 2011). Alpha Natural Resources was the new owner of Massey and had successor
liability for its misconduct. Id.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006).
40. Uhlmann, No Justice, supra note 37.
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tragic loss of life that occurred at the Upper Big Branch mine and
rarely involved anything close to the rampant corporate misconduct
42
committed by Massey. If it was not appropriate to prosecute Massey
for its crimes, it is difficult for me to envision when criminal prosecution of any corporation would be warranted.
The Justice Department’s deal with Massey continues a disturbing trend where corporations avoid criminal charges by entering de43
ferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements. The practice is
not consistent across the Department: in the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division, deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements are rarely used; in the Criminal
Division and some United States Attorney’s offices, such agreements
44
have become almost the norm. The terms of the agreements are attractive to the government, because they often provide large penalties, far-reaching corporate compliance programs with outside monitors approved by the Department, and promises of cooperation by the
45
companies involved. But plea agreements—the preferred approach
prior to the last decade—can offer the same benefits to the government without making it appear that large companies can buy their
46
way out of criminal prosecution.
In this Article, I argue that the use of deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements in the Upper Big Branch mining case
41. Id.
42. The closest parallel to Massey is McWane, Inc., a large pipe manufacturing company, which was prosecuted for violations of worker safety and environmental laws and
concealing illegal activities from federal inspectors. See David M. Uhlmann, Prosecuting
Worker Endangerment: The Need for Stronger Criminal Penalties for Violations of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, Sept. 2008, at 1976–77 (describing
the investigation of McWane and the subsequent pleas and fines); David Barstow & Lowell
Bergman, At a Texas Foundry, an Indifference to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A1 (giving
examples of the dangerous working conditions at McWane).
43. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE CRIME (2009) [hereinafter GAO CORP. CRIME] (“Recently, [the Justice Department] has made more use of
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs), in which prosecutors may require company reform, among other things, in exchange for deferring prosecution.”). Deferred prosecution agreements typically allow prosecutors to file criminal
charges but stay or dismiss those charges after a period of time if the company fulfills certain obligations. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1104
(2006). Non-prosecution agreements allow companies to avoid prosecution, and the collateral consequences associated with prosecution, altogether in exchange for their cooperation. Id. at 1105. For a more in-depth discussion of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements, see infra Part I.A.
44. See infra Part II.A.
45. GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 1.
46. See infra Part II.B.
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and other high-profile matters erodes corporate criminal liability and
undermines the rule of law. I assert that deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements limit the punitive and deterrent value of
the government’s law enforcement efforts and extinguish the societal
47
condemnation that should accompany criminal prosecution. I side
with those within the Justice Department who have resisted the trend
toward deferred prosecution and non-prosecution of corporate crime
and agree with critics who claim that the Department may lack sufficient policies to ensure that abuse of power does not occur in negoti48
ating such agreements. I conclude that the government does not
need the “middle ground” of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements, except for less serious violations where there
are no civil or administrative remedies or perhaps in the rare situation
where prosecutors can demonstrate that a criminal conviction would
49
cause unacceptable harm to innocent third parties.
Part I will trace the evolution of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements for corporations from pretrial diversion programs for individual defendants and will explain how the Justice Department adjusted its corporate prosecution policies to facilitate noncriminal alternatives to corporate prosecution. Part II will summarize
empirical evidence about the surge in deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements over the last decade and will consider justifications for the increase as well as resulting concerns. Part III will explain why deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
erode corporate criminal liability and will demonstrate how their
widespread use is ill-advised from a theoretical and a practical perspective. Part IV will conclude that the Justice Department should
develop guidelines that prohibit the use of deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements in egregious cases and impose approval
requirements to limit their use to the unusual occasions when adequate civil or administrative alternatives are not available.

47. See infra Part III.A.
48. See infra Part II.A (noting disparate approaches to deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements within the Justice Department); Part II.C (discussing criticism
from outside the Department about the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements).
49. See infra Part III.C.
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS AND THE CORRESPONDING
EVOLUTION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S CORPORATE
PROSECUTION POLICIES
Over the last decade, the use of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements has surged within the Justice Department,
particularly its Criminal Division and several United States Attorneys’
50
51
Offices. The Department’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, begun by
the Bush administration after the Enron scandal, pioneered the ability of federal prosecutors to use non-criminal alternatives to obtain
corporate cooperation, including waivers of attorney-client privilege
52
and the work product doctrine. Even after privilege waivers became
disfavored, the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements continued unabated during the remaining years of the
Bush administration and the first four years of the Obama administra53
tion.
The use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements has its roots in pretrial diversion programs for individual defendants. For a wide range of reasons, including the desire to avoid
draconian effects on first-term offenders and the need to conserve
prosecutorial and judicial resources, most prosecuting offices have
pretrial diversion programs. This Part begins with an explanation of
the role of pretrial diversion and its potential application to the corporate setting. I then review the events that prompted the increased
use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements for
corporate crime and the accompanying shifts in the government’s
prosecution policies.

50. GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 13–16; see also Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, University of Virginia School of Law,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/home.suphp (last updated
June 7, 2013) [hereinafter Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements] (maintaining an extensive, and regularly updated, list of Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements).
51. See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (2002) (terminated by Establishment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Pres. Exec. Order, Nov. 17, 2009).
52. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 311, 319–20 (2007).
53. See infra text accompanying note 177.
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A. Pretrial Diversion for Individual Defendants and the Implications for
Corporate Defendants
Prosecutors have used pretrial diversion agreements to resolve
cases involving individual defendants for decades. In most cases, pretrial diversions occur either before or soon after charges are filed. 54
In a pretrial diversion agreement, the defendant is usually required to
acknowledge and accept responsibility for the misconduct, seek any
necessary counseling or treatment (for anger management or drug
addiction, for example), make restitution to any victims, and perform
55
community service. The criminal case is held in abeyance while the
56
defendant completes the terms of the diversion program, usually
57
twelve to eighteen months. Once that period elapses, if the defendant has not committed other crimes and has otherwise complied with
the terms of the agreement, the prosecutor drops the criminal charg58
es.
Eligibility for pretrial diversion varies widely based on the prosecuting office but is typically limited to first-time offenders who have
59
committed relatively minor offenses. Some offices might limit pretrial diversion to youthful offenders who have no prior criminal records, while all first-time offenders might be eligible in other jurisdic60
tions. Some offices might allow pretrial diversion for misdemeanors
61
but prohibit pretrial diversion for felonies. Other offices might in-

54. See United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.010 (2009) [hereinafter USAM], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/22mcrm.htm
(explaining the timing, purpose, and objectives of pretrial diversion); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3154(10) (2006) (stating that a function of pretrial services is to collect, verify, and prepare reports pertaining to pretrial diversion agreements and to perform “such other duties” as required by the agreements).
55. JOHN CLARK, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL DIVERSION AND THE LAW I-1
(2006), available at www.napsa.org/publications/ptdivcaselaw.pdf. Some jurisdictions, but
not all, require a defendant to plead guilty to the charges at the beginning of the program.
Id.
56. Id.
57. See USAM § 9-22.010 (stating that the maximum period of supervision is eighteen
months).
58. CLARK, supra note 55, at I-1.
59. See id. at VI-4-5 (providing an example of a defendant who was removed from the
pretrial diversion program because of prior convictions); see also USAM § 9-22.100 (stating
that a prosecutor can exercise discretion and offer diversion to an offender with fewer
than two prior felony convictions).
60. See USAM § 9-22.010 (giving prosecutors discretion to use pretrial diversion for
any individual “against whom a prosecutable case exists”).
61. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 33-39-1-8(d)(1) (through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (allowing prosecutor to withhold prosecution in misdemeanor cases); ORANGE CNTY. CORR. DEP’T,
MISDEMEANOR/DUI PRETRIAL DIVERSION INFORM. 1
(2012), available at
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stead allow pretrial diversion for all non-violent offenses or limit their
62
programs to those charged with certain offenses.
The theoretical basis for pretrial diversion is utilitarian. First, for
less serious criminal charges, the societal benefits of prosecution may
be outweighed by the costs to the defendant, particularly where
youthful offenders are involved. A criminal record, even for a minor
offense, could make it difficult for the individual to pursue educa63
tional or employment opportunities. If the defendant is able to successfully complete the pretrial diversion program, it is better for society to give the defendant a second chance and not to burden her with
64
a criminal conviction. Second, investigative and prosecutorial resources are limited—as are judicial resources—so it is better for society if the government reserves criminal prosecution for more serious
65
crimes and defendants who are repeat violators.
The Justice Department’s policies on pretrial diversion reflect
the prevailing view that eligibility for diversion should be limited to
66
certain categories of offenders and offenses. United States Attorneys
are authorized to divert individuals who do not have two or more pri67
or felony convictions, which is consistent with the general approach
that diversion should be limited to individuals with little or no crimi68
nal record and should not be available to recidivists. United States
Attorneys also are prohibited from offering diversion to current or
former public officials accused of an offense involving a violation of a
public trust or individuals accused of an offense related to national
69
security or foreign affairs. These limitations, although perhaps more
permissive than those implemented by individual districts, reflect the

www.orangecountyfl.net/Portals/0/resource%20library/jail/Pretrial%20Diversion%20Inf
ormation.pdf (allowing pretrial diversion in misdemeanor and DUI cases only).
62. CLARK, supra note 55, at I-1.
63. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 623, 635–36 (2006) (discussing several federal and state consequences of criminal
convictions).
64. CLARK, supra note 55, at I-1 (describing how pretrial diversion attempts to address
the underlying causes of the arrest so that offenders are “less likely to return to court on
new charges in the future”).
65. See id. (stating that pretrial diversion programs successfully reduce criminal court
caseloads).
66. USAM § 9-22.000; see also USAM, CRIMINAL RES. MANUAL 712, 715.
67. USAM § 9-22.100.
68. See CLARK, supra note 55, at VI-4 (explaining that many pretrial diversion programs
are reserved exclusively for first-time offenders).
69. USAM § 9-22.100.
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widespread belief that more serious crimes should not be eligible for
pretrial diversion.
The Justice Department’s approach to pretrial diversion also reflects the utilitarian theoretical basis for diversion. The United States
Attorneys’ Manual notes that pretrial diversion seeks to “prevent future criminal activity among certain offenders by diverting them from
70
traditional processing into community supervision and services.” In
this respect, pretrial diversion is geared toward the rehabilitation of
71
The
first-time offenders or those with limited criminal records.
United States Attorneys’ Manual also indicates that a primary objective of pretrial diversion is “[t]o save prosecutive and judicial re72
sources for concentration on major cases.” By implication, pretrial
diversion would not be available for major crimes.
I agree that pretrial diversion should be an option in cases involving youthful or first-time offenders who are accused of less serious
crimes. While rehabilitation may have gone out of favor in our crimi73
nal justice system, there is no disputing the impact of a criminal
conviction on an individual’s future and her potential contributions
74
to society. If diversion allows her to be successful and ensures that
she does not engage in future criminal activity, then society and the
individual benefit. At the same time, there are crimes that are so serious that diversion would not be appropriate. Homicide, rape, and
other violent crimes are obvious examples; for other crimes, where to
draw the line depends upon the law enforcement priorities and re75
sources of the prosecuting office.
Of course, if pretrial diversion is appropriate for some individual
defendants, it could be argued that deferred prosecution might be
appropriate for some corporate defendants. Perhaps if a corporate
defendant has a strong compliance record and commits a relatively
minor offense, deferred prosecution might make sense. As with pretrial diversion, there might be variations in eligibility requirements
across prosecuting offices. Some offices might limit deferred prose70. USAM § 9-22.010.
71. CLARK, supra note 55, at II-I.
72. USAM § 9-22.010.
73. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 28–29 (2003); see also Michael Vitello,
Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1012–13 (1991) (noting that the rehabilitative view of the criminal justice system has given way to one that now focuses on retribution).
74. See Pinard, supra note 63, at 635–36 (discussing several of the federal and state
consequences of criminal convictions).
75. See also CLARK, supra note 55, at I-2, I-3 (discussing the various ways different jurisdictions approach pretrial diversions).
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cutions to companies that had no history of violations, while others
might focus on criminal histories. Some offices might limit deferred
prosecutions to misdemeanors, while others might allow for some felonies where there was no harm caused by the conduct. If the pretrial
diversion model were followed, however, a corporate defendant with a
history of violations—or one that committed a more serious crime—
would not be eligible for deferred prosecution.
On the other hand, a large number of corporate prosecutions
occur in the regulatory context, where the government has discretion
76
whether to pursue criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement.
Where the government has multiple enforcement options, it may not
be necessary to have an alternative like deferred prosecution. In cases
where a defendant without a history of violations commits a relatively
minor crime, it might make sense to decline prosecution in favor of
77
civil or administrative enforcement. Given the prevalence of regulatory crime, it might be appropriate to limit deferred prosecutions to
(1) law enforcement programs where civil or administrative enforcement is not an adequate alternative to prosecution and (2) first-time
78
offenders who engage in less serious criminal activity.
In sum, the pretrial diversion model would justify deferred prosecution agreements for corporate crime, if prosecutors limited eligibility based on the defendant’s compliance history and the type of violations involved. Or the government could pursue a hybrid approach
where deferred prosecution agreements were used only where civil or
administrative enforcement was not a viable alternative to prosecution. Instead, the government has pursued neither of these defensible approaches as it has turned to deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements in many of its most high-profile cases over
the last decade, even in cases where the defendants had poor compli79
ance records and had committed egregious crimes.
B. The Justice Department’s Corporate Prosecution Policies Evolve With
the Increased Use of Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution as
Alternatives to Criminal Prosecution
Prior to 2001, the Justice Department rarely entered deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements with corporations as an
alternative to criminal prosecution. A study by University of Virginia
76.
77.
78.
79.

USAM § 9-28.1100.
USAM § 9-28.600.
See infra Part III.A-B.
See infra Part II.
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Law Professor Brandon L. Garrett identified only thirteen deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements in the nine years prior
80
to 2001. In the five years that followed, however, the Justice Department entered thirty-nine deferred prosecution and non81
prosecution agreements, including twenty-six in 2004 and 2005.
The limited number of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements before 2001 is not attributable to an absence
of corporate prosecution during those years. To the contrary, a database of corporate plea agreements also maintained by Professor Garrett indicates that the Justice Department prosecuted at least 101
82
companies for corporate crime in 2000 alone. Moreover, the Justice
Department was particularly aggressive in its efforts to prosecute regulatory crime. The Corporate Crime Reporter issued a report at the
end of the 1990s entitled Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade
that ranked corporate criminals based on the amount of criminal
83
fines imposed. The report found that the top categories of corporate crime were “[e]nvironmental (38), antitrust (20), fraud (13),
campaign finance (7), food and drug (6), [and] financial crimes
84
Regulatory crime almost always involves corporate mis(4) . . . .”
85
conduct and frequently results in corporate charges.

80. Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50. The study identified one
other case, United States v. Doyon Drilling, Inc., as a deferred prosecution. Id. But, in
Doyon Drilling, the Justice Department agreed to defer prosecution on felony charges in
exchange for the defendant’s willingness to enter a guilty plea to misdemeanor charges.
Doyon Drilling Deferred Prosecution Agreement, at 3.
81. Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50. Another study by the Corporate Crime Reporter found that the Justice Department entered only eleven deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements—a little more than one per year. In the four
years that followed, the Department entered twenty-three deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements, or nearly six per year. Russell Mokhiber, Editor, Corp. Crime
Reporter, Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/2005/12/.
82. Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Plea Agreements, University
of Virginia School of Law, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea_agreements/home.
php (last visited June 18, 2013) [hereinafter Garrett & Ashley, Plea Agreements] (maintaining an extensive, and regularly updated, list of Federal Organizational Plea Agreements).
The database is comprehensive beginning in 2001, so it is likely that there were even more
than 101 companies prosecuted during calendar year 2000.
83. Russell Mokhiber, Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade, CORP. CRIME REP.
(Sept. 7, 1999), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/top100.html.
84. Id.
85. Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra note 32 at 1439 (noting that the “overwhelming majority of [pollution crimes] are committed by corporations” including Fortune 500 companies such as BP, Exxon, Rockwell, International Paper, Royal Caribbean, Koch Petroleum, Tyson Foods, W.R. Grace, and Citgo).
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The Justice Department, recognizing that corporate crime was
becoming an increasing focus of its prosecution efforts, decided in
the mid-1990s to provide guidance for prosecutors of corporate
86
crime. Then Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder created an ad
hoc working group coordinated by the Fraud Section of the Criminal
Division and including representatives from the United States Attorneys’ Offices, the Executive Office of United States Attorneys, and the
litigating divisions of the Department with criminal responsibilities
(Antitrust, Civil, Civil Rights, Environment and Natural Resources,
87
and Tax). After an iterative process that included the circulation of
multiple drafts throughout the Department, the deputy attorney general issued the “Federal Prosecution of Corporations” guidance on
June 16, 1999, which would become widely known as the Holder
88
Memo.
The Holder Memo contains extensive language about the benefits of corporate criminal prosecution. It notes that corporate prosecution allows the government to “be a force for positive change of
corporate culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover,
89
and punish white collar crime.” It counsels that corporations should
generally be treated the same as individuals for purposes of corporate
criminal prosecution, including the goal of deterrence, the consequences of conviction, and the adequacy of non-criminal alterna90
tives. It also identifies additional considerations that arise in the
corporate context, including the pervasiveness of wrongdoing and involvement of management, the history of similar misconduct, the
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing, the effectiveness of
91
any compliance program, and collateral consequences.
Significantly, however, the Holder Memo makes no mention of
deferred prosecution or non-prosecution, even when it discusses noncriminal alternatives. Instead, in describing non-criminal alternatives,
the memorandum identifies only civil or regulatory enforcement ac92
tions as examples. In addition, the memorandum notes that noncriminal sanctions may not be appropriate for egregious violations, a
pattern of wrongdoing, or when a history of non-criminal sanctions
86. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys
(June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. § II.A.1–8.
92. Id. § X.A.
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does not produce remediation of the violations. In these ways, the
Holder Memo acknowledged the regulatory nature of most corporate
crime. The Holder Memo also reflected how prosecutors exercised
their discretion in criminal investigations during the 1990s, namely
choosing whether to prosecute or decline in favor of civil or administrative enforcement. Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution were
rarely pursued.
The Justice Department’s approach to corporate prosecution
shifted after its ill-fated prosecution of Arthur Andersen LLP (“Andersen”) in 2002. In the wake of Enron’s collapse, and amidst allegations of accounting fraud, Andersen was charged with obstruction of
justice for shredding documents related to its audits of Enron’s finan94
cial statements. Andersen claimed that “rogue employees” destroyed
the documents, but the shredding of documents occurred even as the
government was investigating Enron’s accounting practices and after
95
Andersen partners expressed concern about the firm’s involvement.
Once Andersen was indicted in 2002, the firm hemorrhaged clients
96
rapidly and went out of business. Andersen later was found guilty at
trial, but the Supreme Court of the United States overturned its con97
viction based on erroneous jury instructions. The Justice Department decided not to retry Andersen after the Supreme Court ruling
98
because the firm was no longer operating.
The Justice Department justified its prosecution of Andersen
based on the massive losses that occurred at Enron, the widespread
fraud in the firm’s financial reports, and its legitimate concern about
the destruction of documents during a pending criminal investiga99
tion. In addition, at the time of the Enron scandal, Andersen had
already incurred a $7 million civil penalty in a Securities and Exchange Commission settlement for its role in other cases of account100
Nonetheless, observers criticized the Department for
ing fraud.
93. Id. § X.B.
94. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged with Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1.
95. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Wide Efforts Seen in Shredding
Data on Enron’s Audits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A1.
96. Roquet v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 398 F.3d 585, 587-88 (7th Cir. 2005).
97. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
98. Carrie Johnson, U.S. Ends Prosecution of Arthur Andersen, WASH. POST, Nov. 23,
2005, at D1.
99. See Eichenwald, supra note 94.
100. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Arthur Andersen LLP Agrees to Settlement Resulting in First Antifraud Injunction in More Than 20 Years and Largest-Ever Civil
Penalty ($7 Million) in SEC Enforcement Action Against a Big Five Accounting Firm (June
19, 2001).
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prosecuting Andersen, claiming that it amounted to a corporate
101
“death penalty” for the firm. When Andersen went out of business,
28,000 employees lost their jobs and competition diminished in the
accounting industry as the “Big Five” accounting firms were reduced
102
to the “Big Four.”
The Justice Department responded to criticism of the Andersen
prosecution by developing revised guidance regarding the prosecu103
tion of corporations in January 2003. The new Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations issued by Deputy Attorney
General Larry Thompson was almost identical to the Holder Memo
with the exception of the section regarding cooperation. For the first
time, the guidance raised the possibility of deferred prosecution for
corporations. The Holder Memo stated that cooperation and voluntary disclosure could warrant “granting a corporation immunity or
104
The Thompson Memo stated that cooperation and volamnesty.”
untary disclosure could merit “granting a corporation immunity or
105
amnesty or pretrial diversion.”
The inclusion of a reference to pretrial diversion in the Thompson Memo did not trigger an increase in deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements; rather, it codified a change in policy
that had begun to occur already at the Justice Department, particularly within the Criminal Division, the Corporate Fraud Task Force, and
some United States Attorneys’ Offices. As noted above, there were
thirteen deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements entered by Justice Department prosecutors in the nine years prior to
106
During 2001 and 2002, prior to issuance of the Thompson
2001.
Memo, United States Attorneys and the Criminal Division entered
107
The
eight deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.
pace then quickened, with fifteen more deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements during 2003 and 2004 after issuance of
108
the Thompson Memo.
101. Carrie Johnson, Ruling Won’t Deter Prosecution of Fraud, WASH. POST, June 1, 2005,
at D1.
102. See Jonathan D. Glater, Last Task at Andersen: Turning Out the Lights, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 30, 2002), at C3.
103. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General on Principles
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Department Components
and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
104. Holder Memo, supra note 86, at § VI.A–B.
105. Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § VI.A–B (emphasis added).
106. See supra text accompanying note 80.
107. See Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50.
108. Id.
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The increase in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements no doubt reflected at least in part concerns about the collateral consequences of criminal convictions and the criticism the Justice Department received based on Andersen’s demise. But it merits
emphasis that the Thompson Memo’s reference to pretrial diversion
(and thus its endorsement of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution) was not in section IX of the memorandum, which ad109
dressed collateral consequences, or in section X of the memoran110
dum, which addressed non-criminal alternatives. The discussion of
collateral consequences was unchanged from the Holder Memo and
focused on whether to prosecute or to decline—not the middle
111
Likewise, the
ground of deferred prosecution or non-prosecution.
guidance regarding non-criminal alternatives continued to emphasize
the alternative of civil or administrative enforcement and made no
112
mention of quasi-criminal options.
Instead, the Thompson Memo embraced deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements to highlight the value of coopera113
The cover memo
tion by companies involved in criminal activity.
circulating the document to the Department stated “[t]he main focus
of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authen114
While the cover memo also
ticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”
referenced compliance programs, the inclusion of language about
pretrial diversion was limited to Section VI of the memorandum, ad115
dressing cooperation and voluntary disclosure, and did not appear
in Section VII regarding corporate compliance programs (which continued to focus solely on the choice between prosecution of the cor116
poration and declination).
I therefore would argue that the Department’s increased use of
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements initially occurred because the government wanted to obtain as much cooperation as possible from corporations involved in criminal activity. The
Holder Memo had authorized prosecutors to seek attorney-client priv117
ilege waivers as a condition of cooperation. As a result, prosecutors
109. Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § IX.
110. Id. § X.
111. Id. § IX.
112. Id. § X.A.
113. Id. § VI; see also Wray & Hur, supra note 43, at 1105 (noting that deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements lead to increased cooperation by companies).
114. Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at 1 (cover memo).
115. Id. § VI.
116. Id. § VII.
117. Holder Memo, supra note 86, at § VI.B.
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sought contemporaneous legal advice provided by corporate counsel
about regulatory compliance and the results of internal investigations
conducted by outside counsel prior to or during government criminal
118
investigations. That practice already had begun to draw even more
heated criticism of the Department than the prosecution of Andersen. Defense attorneys, including many former Justice Department
prosecutors, blasted the Department’s interference with the right to
119
corporate counsel.
The Thompson Memo retained the Holder Memo’s focus on attorney-client privilege waivers but added the option of pretrial diversion to the possible outcomes where a corporation cooperated with a
120
criminal investigation. Under both approaches, prosecutors were to
follow the principles governing non-prosecution generally when eval121
Those provisions of
uating cooperation and voluntary disclosure.
the Principles of Federal Prosecution encouraged prosecutors to seek
reduced sentences or lesser charges in exchange for cooperation and
only authorized non-prosecution if it was the only way to obtain need122
ed cooperation, which is precisely what happened under the Holder
Memo where numerous plea agreements called for attorney-client
123
In contrast, after the Thompson Memo was isprivilege waivers.
sued, an increased number of attorney-client privilege waivers occurred in the context of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
124
agreements.
The shift to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements did not mollify critics of the Justice Department’s requests for
attorney-client privilege waivers. As a result, in 2006, the Justice Department again revised its guidance on corporate criminal prosecution to impose stricter limits on waiver requests and to require prose-

118. Id. § VI.B n.2; David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New
World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 156
(2000).
119. Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporation
Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 351-52 (2008)
(citing Letter from Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n to the Hon. Eric Holder (May 12, 2000)).
120. Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § VI.B.
121. Holder Memo, supra note 86, at § VI; Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § VI.
122. USAM § 9-27.600.
123. Joe D. Whitley et al., The Expanding Criminalization of Environmental Laws, 77-Jan
FLA. B.J. 30, 35 (2003) (citing United States v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., No. A99-0141
CR (D. Ala. 1999); United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 98-0103-CRMiddlebrooks (S.D. Fla. 1999)).
124. Wray & Hur, supra note 43, at 1137–44 (discussing the increase in alternative resolutions following the Thompson Memo and providing examples).
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cutors to obtain supervisory approval before making such requests.
Like the Thompson Memo, the so-called McNulty Memo only refer126
Yet the
enced pretrial diversion in its discussion of cooperation.
127
controversy over privilege waivers continued unabated.
Finally, in 2008, with Congress considering legislation to bar privilege waiver requests, the Justice Department eliminated any credit for
attorney-client privilege waivers in yet another revision to its corporate
128
In so doing, the Department deleted the
prosecution guidelines.
129
references to pretrial diversion in the cooperation section. Instead,
for the first time, the Department endorsed deferred prosecution and
130
non-prosecution in the section regarding collateral consequences.
The 2008 guidance stated:
On the other hand, where the collateral consequences of a
corporate conviction for innocent third parties would be
significant, it may be appropriate to consider a nonprosecution or deferred prosecution agreement with conditions designed, among other things, to promote compliance
with applicable law and to prevent recidivism. Such agreements are a third option, besides a criminal indictment, on
the one hand, and a declination, on the other. Declining
prosecution may allow a corporate criminal to escape without consequences. Obtaining a conviction may produce a
result that seriously harms innocent third parties who played
no role in the criminal conduct. Under appropriate circumstances, a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement can help restore the integrity of a company’s operations and preserve the financial viability of a corporation
that has engaged in criminal conduct, while preserving the
government’s ability to prosecute a recalcitrant corporation
131
that materially breaches the agreement.

125. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General on Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Department Components and
United States Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
126. Id. § VII.B.1.
127. Duggin, supra note 119, at 364–66.
128. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney General on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Department Components and United
States Attorneys § 9-28.720(a) (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Corporate Prosecution Principles].
129. Id.
130. Id. § 9-28.1000.
131. Id.
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The Justice Department thus belatedly embraced the rationale that
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements were a necessary “middle ground” between prosecution and declination.
Whether the Department needs a middle ground between prosecution and declination is far from clear, as I discuss in Parts II and III.
The evolution of the Justice Department’s approach to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, however, is best described
as a policy in search of a rationale. The use of deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements was not contemplated by the Holder
Memo, despite the surge in corporate prosecutions during the 1990s
that prompted its issuance. Even when the concept of pretrial diversion for corporations was introduced by the Thompson Memo and
reaffirmed by the McNulty Memo, it was solely in the context of extracting cooperation from corporations consistent with the Department’s policies on cooperation more generally. The idea that prosecutors needed a middle ground between criminal prosecution and
declination emerged years after the practice of using deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements had taken root within parts
of the Justice Department. With such a weak foundation in policy, it
is no surprise that deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements are used inconsistently within the Justice Department and in
cases where such agreements may not serve the interests of justice.
II. DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
BECOME THE NORM IN MANY HIGH-PROFILE CASES, EVEN AS THE
RATIONALE FOR SUCH AGREEMENTS REMAINS ELUSIVE AND
CONCERNS RISE ABOUT THEIR POTENTIAL MISUSE
The Justice Department continues to prosecute a large number
132
According to a
of corporations every year for corporate crime.
study conducted in 2009 by the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”), most corporations still face criminal prosecution, despite
the increased use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
133
agreements. Professor Garrett’s research supports a similar conclusion, identifying 2166 organizational plea agreements compared to
283 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements for the
134
years covered by his databases. Moreover, U.S. Sentencing Commis-

132. GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 1.
133. Id. at 14–15.
134. Compare Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50 and Garrett & Ashley, Plea Agreements, supra note 82. The database of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements covers 1992 to the present; the database for plea agreements in-
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sion data reveals an average of 210 corporate convictions per year
135
since 2000.
Nonetheless, the Justice Department has made far greater use of
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements over the last
decade, particularly in cases handled by the Criminal Division, which
are often the Department’s most high-profile prosecutions. The
Criminal Division now enters more deferred prosecution and non136
The dramatic inprosecution agreements than plea agreements.
crease in the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements by the Criminal Division—to a point that such agreements have become routine—raises questions about their potential
misuse. Yet, even as reliance on deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements has surged within the Criminal Division and
in some United States Attorney’s Offices, other litigating divisions in
the Justice Department have used the practice only sparingly.
This Part reviews the increased use of deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements by the Justice Department. Part II.A reviews data regarding deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements and how practices vary within the Department. Part II.B
considers possible explanations for the Department’s increased reliance on non-criminal alternatives. Part II.C analyzes concerns that
have been raised about the increased use of deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements.
A. Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements Are Widely
Used by the Criminal Division and Some U.S. Attorneys but Rarely by
Other Litigating Divisions That Prosecute Corporate Crime
The use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, which began in 2001, increased dramatically starting in 2004
137
and 2005. According to the data collected by Professor Garrett, the
entire Justice Department entered just thirteen deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements in the nine years between 1992 and
138
In the next three years, as broader use of such agreements
2000.
began, the Department entered another thirteen deferred prosecu-

cludes convictions from 1994 to the present, although as noted previously it is incomplete
prior to 2001. See supra note 82.
135. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1870 (Appendix) (2011) [hereinafter Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions].
136. See infra text accompanying notes 145–150.
137. Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50.
138. Id.
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tion and non-prosecution agreements.
In 2004 and 2005, the Department averaged thirteen more agreements each year—as many in
140
two years as the previous twelve years combined.
But 2004 and 2005 were just the beginning of what would be a
dramatic surge in the use of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements. From 2006 through 2012, the Justice Department entered 216 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements with corporations, which is an average of nearly thirty-one
141
During that seven-year period, the Justice
agreements each year.
Department never entered less than twenty-two such agreements (in
142
2009) and entered as many as forty-one in one year (2007). While
the Justice Department has stated that 2007 was an “aberration” because it was significantly higher than the years immediately before
143
and after, the Department entered nearly as many deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements in 2010 (thirty-eight agreements) and 2012 (thirty-seven agreements) as it had in 2007 (forty144
one agreements).
The use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements has occurred most often in the Justice Department’s Criminal
145
Division. In its 2009 study regarding corporate crime and the use of
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, the GAO
found that the Criminal Division used deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements more frequently than criminal prosecutions
146
from fiscal year 2004 through 2009. During that six-year period, according to the GAO study, the Criminal Division brought thirty-eight
criminal prosecutions against corporations, while entering forty-four
147
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. In contrast,
United States Attorneys prosecuted 1659 corporations during that
timeframe and entered ninety-four deferred prosecution and non148
prosecution agreements.
The Criminal Division’s preference for deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements has increased in the last three fiscal
years, according to the database created by Professor Garrett. In fiscal
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 13.
Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50.
GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 14–15.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id.
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years 2010 through 2012, the Criminal Division entered twenty-two
149
During the same three years,
plea agreements with corporations.
the Criminal Division entered forty-six deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements, which is more than it entered during the
150
The Criminal Division still
previous six fiscal years combined.
brings criminal charges against corporations—and it prosecutes individuals for their role in corporate crime—but it is startling how much
it now favors deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.
During the last three years, more than two-thirds of the Criminal Division’s corporate cases have been resolved by deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements.
The Criminal Division is not the only component within the Justice Department that makes frequent use of deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements. From fiscal year 2004 through fiscal
year 2012, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York entered twenty-nine deferred prosecution and non151
prosecution agreements. During the same time period, a significant
number of such agreements were entered by United States Attorneys
in Massachusetts (16), New Jersey (12), the Central District of Cali152
Still, those
fornia (11), and the Eastern District of New York (11).
numbers pale in comparison to the ninety deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements entered by the Criminal Division during
the same fiscal years.
Moreover, the Criminal Division’s widespread use of deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements sets it apart from the
Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division, which are the two other litigating divisions at the Justice Department that handle the most corporate criminal prosecutions. According to the GAO report, the Environment and Natural Resources
Division entered two deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements during the seventeen-year period from fiscal year 1993 to
153
The Antitrust Division entered three deferred prosecution
2009.
149. Garrett & Ashley, Plea Agreements, supra note 134.
150. Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 15 n.29, 35. One of those cases involved a prosecution for false statements at
a nuclear facility where there were significant questions about whether Nuclear Regulatory
Commission personnel at the site were aware of conditions that gave rise to the false
statement claim. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company to Pay $28 Million Relating to Operation of Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station
(Jan. 20, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/January/06_enrd_029.
html. No civil alternatives were available to prosecutors. Id. Two of the individuals
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and non-prosecution agreements during that same seventeen-year
154
timeframe. Likewise, during fiscal years 2010 through 2012, the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division
continued to favor criminal prosecution over deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements. The Environment and Natural Resources Division entered forty-two plea agreements with corporations
during that three-year period, while entering just one deferred prose155
The Antitrust Division entered forty-five plea
cution agreement.
agreements with corporations during that three-year period, while en156
tering four non-prosecution agreements.
Of course, the Criminal Division is responsible for more criminal
statutes than other parts of the Justice Department and has more
criminal prosecutors than any other component. It therefore makes
sense that it might enter more deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements than other parts of the Department. Yet the
contrast is stark between the Criminal Division’s embrace of deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements and the degree to
which the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division have avoided such agreements in most cases.
The Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division were responsible for half of the cases listed in the Corpo157
rate Crime Reporter’s top 100 corporate prosecutions of the 1990s and
continue to be aggressive in prosecuting corporate crime. Environmental crime was the largest category of corporate convictions in the
158
As a re2011 study by Professor Garrett; antitrust crime was third.
sult, while the Criminal Division may have broader criminal responsibilities, the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division also have significant roles in corporate criminal
prosecution.
Another factor that might lead to more deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements in the Criminal Division is the fact that,
charged in the case also entered deferred prosecution agreements; one was acquitted at
trial. Tom Henry, Penalties Nixed for Ex-Worker at Davis-Besse, BLADE, Aug. 29, 2009.
154. GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 15 n.29, 35.
155. Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50; Garrett & Ashley, Plea
Agreements, supra note 134. During that three year period, the Environment and Natural
Resources Division also obtained the convictions of eight corporations after trials.
156. Id.
157. Mokhiber, supra note 83.
158. Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions, supra note 135, at 1873. The top three categories of
corporate convictions identified by Professor Garrett were environmental crimes (232),
various types of fraud (189), and antitrust violations (116). Id. Some of the fraud cases
were handled by the Criminal Division with the remainder prosecuted by U.S. Attorneys
and other Divisions.
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when it declines cases, they must be referred to other litigating divisions for enforcement. In contrast, the Environment and Natural Resource Division and the Antitrust Division have civil enforcement offices within their divisions, which might facilitate referrals for civil
enforcement. Yet organizational structure does not explain why the
Criminal Division uses deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements so much more than other divisions. Criminal prosecutors
never know when they decline a case whether it will be addressed by
their civil counterparts, even if they work within a division that has civil enforcement authority, because civil attorneys have their own priorities and reach independent judgments about the merits of each case.
B. The Rationale for the Justice Department’s Embrace of Deferred
Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements
The variation in the Justice Department’s use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements makes it difficult to provide a
rationale for the Department’s approach. First, as the Department’s
corporate prosecution policies state, deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements could be an attempt to avoid collateral consequences like those that occurred in the Andersen case. Second, the
use of such agreements could be seen as an incentive for companies
to waive attorney-client privilege and perhaps to appease critics of
waiver requests. Third, deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements, which emerged as an alternative during the Bush administration, could be viewed as the predictable response of a businessfriendly administration to increased corporate crime. Fourth, the
Department could be seeking to prioritize structural reform over
prosecution. I review each of these possible rationales before offering
my own: a simple cost-benefit analysis that is at once opportunistic
and motivated by expediency.
The Justice Department’s stated justification for entering deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements is the desire to
159
The 2008 revision to the Principles
avoid collateral consequences.
of Federal Prosecution for Business Organizations, which remains the
only one of the four corporate prosecution guidance documents that
mentions deferred prosecution, does so in the context of collateral
160
consequences. In a September 2012 speech extolling the virtues of
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, the Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division repeated the justification
159. USAM § 9-28.1000.B.
160. Id.
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from the 2008 memo that prosecutors needed a middle ground between prosecution and declination to avoid undesired collateral harm
161
to employees and shareholders.
Yet by the time the 2008 document had been issued, the surge in
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements had been ongoing for years under the Thompson Memo and the McNulty Memo,
which only referenced pretrial diversions and in the context of coop162
In fact, the Department entered more deferred prosecueration.
163
tion and non-prosecution agreements in 2007 than any other year,
before the Department decided that collateral consequences had replaced cooperation as the justification for entering such agreements.
Moreover, despite the focus on avoiding collateral consequences
in the Principles of Federal Prosecution for Business Organizations,
there is no evidence that deferred prosecution or non-prosecution is
necessary to avoid the “death penalty” for corporations involved in
164
To the contrary, most criminal prosecutions do
criminal activity.
not result in the severe collateral consequences incurred by Ander165
sen. Andersen was a special case because it was an accounting firm
charged with massive accounting fraud. Andersen’s conduct and the
publicity it received might have compromised its business model even
166
in the absence of a criminal conviction. No other high-profile pros167
ecutions have resulted in similar collateral consequences.
Of course, it is conceivable that there could be collateral consequences short of the corporate death penalty that could harm employees or shareholders. For example, a company could contract in
size or lose shareholder value because of a criminal prosecution, as
168
BP did in the wake of the Gulf oil spill. Or there might be concerns
161. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div.,
Address at the New York City Bar Association: The Role of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in White Collar Criminal Law Enforcement (Sept. 13, 2012).
162. McNulty Memo, supra note 125, at § VII.
163. Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50. The Justice Department
entered forty-one deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements in 2007. Id.
164. Gabriel H. Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132242.
165. Id. at 36.
166. Id. at 36–37.
167. The top twenty-five companies from the Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade all
remain in business. Mokhiber, supra note 83; see also Markoff, supra note 164, at 29–31, 36
(explaining that only five of the companies convicted of corporate crimes in the years
2001–2010 went out of business).
168. Christine Hauser, BP’s Shareholders Take It on the Chin, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at
B1. Ironically, the Criminal Division prosecuted BP despite these collateral consequences.
Id.

1322

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1295

about the impact on innocent third parties, as in the WakeMed case
in North Carolina. In WakeMed, an $8 million deferred prosecution
agreement was entered because criminal charges would have jeopardized access to health care for elderly and poor residents who receive
169
Medicare and Medicaid benefits.
Yet cases like WakeMed, where there was a real possibility of collateral consequences affecting innocent third parties, appear to be
more the exception than the rule. There is no indication of similar
collateral consequences in the overwhelming majority of cases resolved by deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. Indeed, it would be curious if there were such collateral consequences
in more than two-thirds of the cases handled by the Criminal Division
but rarely in cases handled by other Justice Department litigating divisions.
There is far more evidence that the Justice Department’s goal
was to obtain privilege waivers through deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements, which occurred frequently after the is170
Indeed, since the surge in desuance of the Thompson Memo.
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements occurred after
the Thompson Memo, it would be more logical to conclude that privilege waivers were the impetus for many of the deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements entered prior to 2008, as I argue in
171
Corporate crime prosecutors want to ensure that corporaPart I.
tions, like individuals, share information in their possession regarding
172
Much of that intheir co-conspirators and accomplices in crime.
formation in the corporate context is shrouded in privilege, either
because it involved communication between attorneys and corporate
officials at the time of the misconduct or because it was developed after the fact during internal investigations conducted by outside coun173
sel.
Attorney-client privilege waivers had been obtained in plea
agreements during the 1990s, but with criticism of the practice
mounting after issuance of the Thompson Memo, prosecutors may
have felt they needed to offer a greater benefit to corporations in ex174
change for privilege waivers. As noted above, the reference to pre169. Judge OKs WakeMed Fraud Settlement, WRAL.COM, (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.wral.
com/judge-oks-wakemed-fraud-settlement/12084601/.
170. Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 899–900.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 117 and 118.
172. McNulty Memo, supra note 125, at § VII.A.
173. Id. §§ VII.B., VII.B.2.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 119–124.
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trial diversion in the Thompson Memo’s discussion of cooperation
provides evidence that the Justice Department accelerated its use of
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution to secure privilege waiv175
ers. But the Department’s desire to obtain privilege waivers cannot
explain why deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
continued after the Principles of Federal Prosecution for Business
Organizations disavowed privilege waivers in 2008. The desire to obtain privilege waivers thus may explain the initial increase in deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, but it cannot explain
their continued use by the Department over the last four years.
A perhaps cynical explanation would be that the Bush administration, although it justified deferred prosecution and nonprosecution with references to cooperation and collateral consequences, was motivated simply by politics. On this account, the surge
in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements was a political handout from a pro-business administration that was not committed to corporate prosecution. Such a partisan narrative may appeal to
176
some; however, it lacks factual support. The Justice Department entered 125 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements during the first term of the Obama administration, just four fewer than
the 129 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements entered by the Justice Department during both terms of the Bush ad177
ministration.
Still another explanation, offered by Professor Garrett, is that the
Justice Department sought deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements to achieve structural reform within corporations that were
178
accused of wrongdoing. According to Professor Garrett, the Justice
Department made a conscious choice to prioritize structural reforms,
which are contained in most deferred prosecution and non179
In
prosecution agreements, over more traditional punitive goals.
other words, ensuring future compliance became more important to
the government than meting out punishment, particularly because
individuals could still be criminally prosecuted and face incarceration.
Professor Garrett marshals effectively empirical support for the
argument that deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
175. Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § VI.
176. Accord Duggin, supra note 119, at 351–54 (suggesting that during the Bush era, the
Thompson Memo and corporate crime prosecution reform were made in response to the
“financial debacle” that followed the collapse of Enron rather than as part of a political
agenda).
177. Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50.
178. Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35.
179. Id. at 886–91.
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have emphasized corporate compliance programs. But the frequent
inclusion of structural reforms may prove too much about the Justice
Department’s rationale for entering deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements. After all, the Department sought similar
180
structural reforms in plea agreements throughout the 1990s. In addition, the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division, which rarely utilize deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements, continue to insist on corporate compliance
181
in plea agreements they negotiate. Indeed, even the Criminal Division includes corporate compliance programs when it enters plea
agreements, as demonstrated most recently by its agreements with BP
182
If both plea
Production and Exploration for the Gulf oil spill.
agreements and deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements require corporate compliance programs, it is difficult to claim
that the government must enter deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements to achieve structural reforms.
I therefore would argue that the Justice Department’s motivation
for pursuing deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
has been far less high-minded than concern for collateral consequences or a desire for cooperation or structural reform. For proponents of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements the
bottom line is the same: the Justice Department can obtain the same
financial penalties, factual admissions, corporate cooperation, and
183
structural reforms that could be achieved from plea agreements. In
some cases, it could fare even better, at least in terms of financial
184
penalties. But it nearly always fares at least as well as it would have
with a corporate prosecution and without investing the investigative,
prosecutorial, or judicial resources that might be needed in a corpo185
It is a simple cost-benefit analysis. The benefits
rate prosecution.
are equal or greater than prosecution, and the costs are less.
180. Id. at 907.
181. For example, see the plea agreements in United States v. Evergreen Int’l S.A., CR
05-238 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2005) and United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 03-CR-00203
(W.D. Mo. 2003).
182. United States v. BP Prod. & Exploration, Inc., No. 2:12-CR-00292 (E.D. La. 2012).
183. Accord Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 907 (noting that the Department, at one point, favored plea agreements to deferral prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements in seeking structural reforms).
184. See Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions, supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting
that the average financial penalty for deferred and non-prosecution agreements is almost
three times greater than the average penalty associated with plea agreements).
185. Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 932 (suggesting that deferred and nonprosecution agreements are more efficient than prosecutions because they require fewer
judicial resources).
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Former Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray, who was
an architect of the Thompson Memo and oversaw the growth in the
use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements by the
Criminal Division, described the benefit side of the analysis starkly in
186
a 2004 speech. He stated:
The DP structure has many of the same benefits as a conviction. In terms of remedies, anything that the judge could
impose under the organizational sentencing guidelines can
be required under a DP agreement. Now, the DP won’t result in a criminal conviction if the defendant company complies with the agreement, but filing charges sends a message
187
[that] the public condemns the company’s conduct.
Representatives of the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division presented the same message during an Environmental Crimes Policy
Committee Meeting in April 2005 when I headed the Justice Depart188
The attorneys from the
ment’s Environmental Crimes Section.
Fraud Section explained that deferred prosecution had become their
default position, because it allowed them to prosecute cases more efficiently and achieve equal or better results.
I hesitate to suggest that the government has been merely expedient in pursuing deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. I have no doubt that at least some agreements were entered
because of the desire to obtain full cooperation and perhaps out of
concern about collateral consequences. I also agree with Professor
Garrett that the Justice Department values corporate compliance programs and sees them as a benefit of its deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements.
But with so many rationales and no consistent narrative to support the Justice Department’s approach, it is hard to escape the conclusion that some prosecutors may be ambivalent about the role of
corporate criminal prosecution and therefore willing to sacrifice it too
readily for non-criminal alternatives that include otherwise attractive
settlement terms. A similar discomfort with corporate criminal prose186. Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div., Remarks to the Association
of Certified Fraud Examiners, Mid-South Chapter, Memphis, Tennessee (Sept. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/2004/september/0902-04wray-remarks-memphis.pdf.
187. Id.
188. The Environmental Crimes Policy Committee includes senior attorneys from the
Environmental Crimes Section, Assistant United States Attorneys who prosecute environmental crime, and representatives of the law enforcement agencies that investigate environmental crimes. The policy committee is chaired by the Chief of the Environmental
Crimes Section.
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cution is reflected in the academic literature, which I discuss in Part
III. Such discomfort is misplaced in the Justice Department, however,
which is responsible for upholding the rule of law.
C. Concerns About the Misuse of Deferred Prosecution and NonProsecution Agreements
The Justice Department’s embrace of deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements over the last decade has been criticized
for a number of policy reasons. Some have argued that the Department favors large companies over small businesses, and domestic cor189
porations over foreign companies. Others have expressed concern
about the extent to which the agreements focus on corporate compliance programs and thus involve the Department in management controls and structural reform that may go beyond its core area of litiga190
Those objections have been intensified as the Detion expertise.
Department has supported the use of corporate monitors who often
191
are former high-level officials at the Department. There also is lingering discomfort with the lack of meaningful judicial oversight of de192
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. As noted previously, there has been widespread criticism of the Department’s
position on cooperation by corporations. I agree with the first four
concerns to varying degrees, as I discuss below. With regard to cooperation, I fault the Department more for failing to make a better case
for its position, which I also address below.
First, empirical evidence suggesting that the Justice Department
pursues non-criminal alternatives more frequently with large companies and domestic corporations should be troubling to the Depart193
ment. If larger companies are more likely to receive the benefits of
189. Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions, supra note 135, at 1810–14; see also Alice Fisher, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the American Bar Review National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf (describing DOJ’s
commitment to prosecuting foreign firms to ensure that “major foreign competitors to
U.S. companies are subject to the same stringent rules”).
.
190 Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 856.
.
191 Id. at 926; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE CRIME: PROSECUTORS
ADHERED TO GUIDANCE IN SELECTING MONITORS FOR DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT DOJ COULD BETTER COMMUNICATE ITS ROLE IN
RESOLVING CONFLICTS, GAO-10-260T (2009).
192. Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 920–21 (noting the extent of prosecutorial discretion and the deferential, limited nature of judicial review).
193. Garrett identifies a number of troubling trends in the use of deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements. Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution occur most
often during investigations of large, publicly owned corporations. Id. at 1811. Smaller,
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deferred prosecution or non-prosecution, it is hard to see how the
Department is meeting its fundamental obligation to do justice and
ensure the fair and even-handed enforcement of the law. Much as we
should be concerned about wealthy, individual defendants receiving
more favorable treatment in the criminal justice system, it should not
be the case that companies with greater financial resources fare better
than small businesses. For many of the same reasons, we should not
allow global corporations to receive less favorable treatment in our
criminal justice system than domestic corporations.
Whether a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement
is offered to a company should not depend on its corporate earnings,
or on its domestic or foreign status. The Justice Department would
no doubt dispute that any such considerations influence its actions,
and I will assume it does not intentionally favor large, domestic corporations when deciding whether to enter deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements. Still, even the appearance of such dis194
parate treatment—which the empirical evidence supports —is a
concern that the Justice Department should address. If the Department continues to use deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements, it should develop standards that ensure that eligibility for
non-criminal disposition does not depend upon financial resources or
whether a corporation is domestic or global.
Second, it is reasonable to ask whether criminal prosecutors are
best situated to seek structural reforms in corporate governance, as
frequently occurs in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
195
agreements. On the one hand, prosecutors are well informed about
what makes for an ineffective corporate compliance program, but it
does not follow that they have any particular expertise in how to translate that knowledge into an understanding of what constitutes an effective corporate compliance program. On the other hand, preventing future violations by companies is a legitimate law enforcement
goal. Including a commitment to corporate compliance as a term of
agreements reached with corporate defendants would appear to be
sound policy, and it also is understandable that the Justice Depart-

privately held corporations more often face criminal prosecution. Id. Domestic companies are offered deferred prosecution and non-prosecution far more often than foreign
corporations, which usually must plead guilty to criminal charges. Id. In addition, deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements occur most often in Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) cases. Id. at 1875.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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ment seeks more than simple promises about compliance in its
196
agreements.
Third, when the Justice Department selects corporate monitors
who are former high-level officials within the Department, it should
not be surprised that its actions are questioned. Nor should the Department negotiate for special terms of agreements that would support favorite charities or establish an endowed chair at the law school
197
attended by the United States Attorney. Such practices, even if well
intended, raise conflicts of interest and could be seen as self-dealing.
The Department has wisely issued guidance about the selection of
198
corporate monitors. The Department would be well advised to implement similar policies to ensure that community service and other
terms of its resolutions with corporations do not involve abuse of
199
prosecutorial authority.
Fourth, there is little or no judicial oversight of deferred prosecu200
In deferred prosecutions,
tion and non-prosecution agreements.
charges are filed and the court must approve the waiver of the statute
201
of limitations that occurs while prosecution is deferred. The resulting judicial review is at best perfunctory; no court has ever rejected a
202
With non-prosecution agreedeferred prosecution agreement.
203
ments, there is no judicial role at all. Charges are never filed, so the
196. See USAM §§ 9-27.400, 9-27.800 (discussing plea agreements generally as well as
corporate compliance programs).
197. See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 916 (discussing the criticism faced
by deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements that contained certain “community service” requirements not directly related to the underlying offense with which the
company was charged).
198. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford on Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations to
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008).
199. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING GUIDANCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROSECUTIONS, INCLUDING THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCING MEASURES (2000). In
the Gulf oil spill criminal prosecutions of BP Production and Exploration and Transocean,
prosecutors have directed billions of dollars to the Congressionally-chartered National
Wildlife Foundation for Gulf Coast restoration efforts. Support for restoration efforts is
laudable but it raises the question of whether prosecutors should control how funds from
criminal settlements—and non-criminal alternatives—are spent.
200. See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 921 (noting that judicial oversight of
structural reform agreements remains limited). But see United States v. HSBC Bank USA,
N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6–13 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (holding that
courts have authority to approve or reject deferred prosecution agreements pursuant to
their supervisory powers to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2006); see also supra note 43.
202. Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 893. Judge Boyle’s criticism of the
WakeMed deferred prosecution agreement is an exception to the de minimis review that
usually occurs. See supra note 169.
203. Id. at 902–05.
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agreement is merely a contract between the government and the cor204
Judicial involvement does not guarantee that the public
poration.
interest will be better served or that the rights of the corporate defendant will be better protected. But deferred prosecution and non205
prosecution agreements occur in major, high-profile investigations.
The involvement of a neutral arbiter in a public forum would help
ensure the fairness of the agreements and provide the accountability
the public deserves.
A related concern is that the Justice Department’s authority to
enter deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements is limited. There is a single statutory mention of deferred prosecution in
206
the federal code section that addresses statute of limitations waivers.
Perhaps that reference may be an implicit acknowledgement that the
Department is authorized to enter such agreements, but Congress has
never explicitly provided such authority nor imposed limits on its
proper use. It should give us pause that the Justice Department is resolving a significant number of high-profile cases using agreements
that are not subject to judicial review and for which the Department
207
does not have express statutory authorization.
The controversy surrounding attorney-client privilege waivers has
largely subsided since the 2008 revisions to the Principles of Federal
Prosecution for Business Organizations disallowed such requests. Yet
the inclusion of privilege waivers in deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements remains one of the most heavily criticized as208
I agree
pects of the Justice Department’s use of such agreements.
with those who expressed concern about how often the Department
requested privilege waivers prior to 2008; such waivers should only be
sought in the unusual cases when they are necessary to obtain factual
information about corporate crime. I disagree with those who argue
that the Department should never seek or credit privilege waivers
from corporations. Rather, I fault the Department for not making a
stronger case for the limited use of privilege waiver requests.
204. Id.
205. The average penalty in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
entered from 2001 to 2010 was $24 million; plea agreements entered during the same period averaged $7.5 million. Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions, supra note 135, at 1873.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2006).
207. See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 905 (“The Supreme Court has held
that the executive branch ‘has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide
whether to prosecute a case.’”).
208. AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT 3–4 n.7 (2006), available at http://www.acca.com/
Surveys/attyclient2.pdf.
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As noted in the previous Section, corporations can and should be
expected to provide any information in their possession about criminal activity, if they intend to cooperate with a government investigation and receive credit in any agreement with the government resolv209
If that is possible to do
ing the corporation’s criminal liability.
without waiver of privilege, the government should not insist on waiver. But if waiver is necessary for the government to obtain complete
cooperation from a corporation, it is not clear why the government
210
should not be able to request privilege waivers.
I would suggest that the Justice Department went too far when it
amended the Principles of Federal Prosecution for Business Organi211
The attorney-client privilege deserves protection,
zations in 2008.
and the government should limit its requests for waiver so that corporations are incentivized to seek counsel about their conduct and outside counsel can conduct effective internal investigation when criminal activity occurs. But the idea that waivers of privilege were an
abuse that needed to be precluded in all cases elevates the privilege
beyond even the protection under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
212
Constitution against self-incrimination, which every cooperating individual defendant agrees to waive. It is hard to see why an evidentiary privilege, even one as essential to effective representation as the
attorney-client privilege, should be entitled to greater protection than
the constitutional rights provided by the Fifth Amendment.
The Justice Department did not seek attorney-client privilege
waivers more often because of its decision to allow deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. To the contrary, the Justice
Department sought waivers in corporate cases during the 1990s, before the push for deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, as the language of the Holder Memo (issued in 1999) made
213
clear. It would be more accurate to say that the Department’s embrace of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution was an attempt to
give more credit for waivers of attorney-client privilege, thus implicitly
209. See supra text accompanying notes 172 and 173.
210. See Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV 1, 54 (2008) (“[R]etaining the ability of federal prosecutors to ask a corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege . . . is in the public’s best interest when waiver is necessary to conduct a complex criminal investigation efficiently.”).
211. See Corporate Prosecution Principles, supra note 128.
212. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
213. For example see the plea agreements in Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 980103-CR-Middlebrooks (S.D. Fla. 1999) and John Morrell and Co. CR-96-40004 (D.S.D.
1996).
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acknowledging the criticism that already was mounting about waiver
requests. Some might view additional credit as coercing waivers but
the broader point is that the criticism of the Department based on
waiver requests is less about deferred prosecution and nonprosecution and more a question of what steps cooperating corporations should be expected to take.
In sum, the fairness concerns raised by deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements may have validity and would appear to
warrant increased attention by the Justice Department. Questions also have been properly raised about special terms of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, although the Department has
214
Concerns about structural retaken steps to address those issues.
form and cooperation are less about deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements, and more a matter of what the government
should be seeking in resolutions with corporations. The only degree
to which those concerns are heightened in the deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution context is because of the coercive effect when
the government bargains over whether there will be a criminal convic215
Whether it is appropriate for the governtion of the corporation.
ment to leverage the threat of criminal prosecution is one of the
more fundamental questions raised by deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements, which I address in the next Part.
III. DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
UNDERMINE THE PROSECUTION OF CORPORATE CRIME
The Justice Department’s increased use of deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements over the last decade is difficult to
reconcile with the purposes of corporate criminal prosecution, the
Department’s policies about pretrial diversion and non-prosecution,
and the role of criminal prosecutors in the criminal justice system. In
this Part, I address each of these issues and the deleterious effects of
the result-oriented embrace of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements.

214. Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 916.
215. Id. at 905.
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A. Deferred Prosecution and Non Prosecution Agreements Undermine the
Purposes of Corporate Criminal Liability
The United States has held corporations criminally liable for the
better part of the last century, 216 even though many other countries do
217
not. Under our jurisprudence, corporations can be held criminally
responsible for the acts of their employees or agents, committed within the scope of the employment or agency, for the benefit of the cor218
Corporate criminal liability can be imposed even if the
poration.
conduct occurs at low levels within the corporation and in cases where
219
In addition,
the company had policies that forbade such conduct.
corporations can be found to have the requisite mens rea for criminal
culpability under the collective knowledge doctrine, even if no indi220
vidual within the company had the requisite intent.
The broad imposition of corporate criminal liability is not without detractors. The Model Penal Code recommended limiting corporate liability to circumstances where there was at least some evidence
221
that management of the company was involved in the violations.
The Model Penal Code also would have allowed corporations to raise
as a defense the fact that the company had internal rules forbidding
222
such conduct. In these ways, the Model Penal Code sought to limit
corporate criminal liability to situations where the corporation as a
whole had a broader role and to avoid the imposition of liability
based on the acts of individual employees.
The Model Penal Code reforms have been rejected because of
the belief that better management controls and training of subordi223
In other words, the absence of
nates would prevent wrongdoing.
management controls and training often results in wrongdoing, so
that requiring active management involvement before imposing criminal liability on the corporation would ignore the failure to act by
management that often leads to misconduct. Likewise, many corpo216. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism
and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 868–70 (2003).
217. Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions, supra note 135, at 1777–78.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 34.
219. United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004–06 (9th Cir. 1972).
220. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1962).
222. Id.; see also Ellen S. Podger, A New Corporate World Mandates a Good Faith Affirmative
Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2007) (discussing affirmative defenses, which reward “company[ies] that act[] in good faith . . . to preclude improper conduct within its
midst”).
223. See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 903 (noting structural reforms that
seek to prevent wrongdoing).
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rate compliance programs exist only on paper and are not implemented in ways that ensure compliance. Where compliance is a management priority and promoted with training, auditing and internal
mechanisms to achieve compliance, violations can be avoided.
Others have criticized corporate criminal liability at a more fundamental level, arguing that there is no beneficial purpose served by
224
These criticisms start
imposing criminal liability on corporations.
from the proposition that corporations exist only to achieve lawful
purposes and therefore any unlawful action carried out in the name
225
of the corporation is antithetical to the corporate charter. Even if it
is possible for a corporation to act unlawfully, a corporation is a legal
fiction that can never be a person as that term is understood in the
226
A corporation cannot be jailed. It cannot
broader criminal law.
lose its right to vote or its right to carry firearms or otherwise be deprived of its civil liberties in the way that individuals can, so it is fair to
ask what purpose is served by the criminal prosecution of corporations.
Still, others would argue, from a utilitarian standpoint, that there
is nothing to be gained by criminal prosecution that cannot be
227
achieved outside the criminal justice system. Admissions of liability,
although often noticeably absent from civil penalty actions, could be
required in civil cases. Substantial fines could be imposed in civil cases. Consent decrees could include structural reforms, restitution obligations, and community service projects. In other words, there is no
term of a criminal settlement that could not be part of a civil settlement—and it is far easier to impose civil liability (in terms of burden
228
of proof) and the costs to society therefore are less.
Of course, it is true that corporations cannot be jailed and have
229
It therefore
“no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked.”
may be less obvious that there is a retributivist argument to be made
224. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 389 (1981) (suggesting
that prosecution of a company may not deter illegal behavior); V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1478–79 (1996) (examining whether the characteristics of corporate criminal liability justify its existence).
225. See Khanna, supra note 224, at 1480 (“[Under] the ultra vires doctrine, . . . courts
would not hold corporations accountable for acts, such as crimes, that were not provided
for in their charters.”).
226. See id. (“[The] courts’ literal understanding of criminal procedure . . . required
the accused to be brought physically before the court.”).
227. Id. at 1479.
228. Id. at 1520–30.
229. Coffee, supra note 224, at 386 (quoting Edward, First Baron Thurlow, the Lord
Chancellor of England).
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about the need for corporate criminal liability as a “just desserts” for
engaging in criminal misconduct. Yet we give corporations “personhood” in many other areas of the law, including most notably the First
230
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, so it would be inconsistent to
deny their personhood in the context of the criminal law. Moreover,
the claim that corporations are not “real” persons, while obviously
true in a biological sense, does not mean that corporations are not
231
significant entities from an economic or moral standpoint.
Corporations dominate so many aspects of our economy and
have such outsized ability to do good or harm in our communities
that their conduct has impacts that far exceed what individuals can
232
Corporations employ citizens and provide goods and serachieve.
vices on a scale that individuals cannot. Corporations can innovate
and provide opportunities that individual action cannot. On the other hand, when corporations engage in misconduct, the resulting
harms may far exceed the suffering inflicted by an individual. Because of their sheer size, a corporate polluter can cause far more environmental harm than an individual. A company that makes unsafe
products can create far greater public health risks. Most corporations
comply with the law and contribute in a positive ways in our communities, but there are some companies that break the law and risk or
cause great harm.
I also would suggest that corporations can be moral actors. Corporate ethics is a significant topic in business schools and boardrooms
233
and matters to corporate leadership, employees, and investors.
Corporations promote economic activity but also work to be good
corporate citizens in their communities through civic engagement
and charitable work. When they act responsibly, corporations are
valued beyond their economic contributions. They serve as role
models, not only to their employees, but also to their customers and
230. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (recognizing that the First Amendment applies to corporations) (citations omitted); Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“Corporations and other
associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination
of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”).
231. Accord Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482–84 (2009).
232. Id.
233. See generally JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1999); Melissa Korn, Does an ‘A’ in Ethics Have Any Value?: BSchools Step Up Efforts to Tie Moral Principles to Their Business Programs, but Quantifying Those
Virtues Is Tough, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2013, 7:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100
01424127887324761004578286102004694378.html (discussing the increasing emphasis
placed on ethics education in business schools).
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other companies. Conversely, when corporations engage in misconduct, their actions may be unethical or immoral.
I therefore assert that corporate wrongdoing deserves criminal
punishment. We can debate whether too much conduct is criminalized in America and whether the criminal law has been used too often
234
But within the spheres
to address social and economic problems.
that we impose criminal liability, corporations can engage in misconduct that deserves criminal punishment, even if that punishment
235
cannot include incarceration. Incarceration is not the only form of
punishment we impose, even on individuals, and yet we always think
of a criminal punishment as different in kind from a non-criminal
sanction. That distinction holds true for corporations as well.
Likewise, while some argue there is no utilitarian justification for
imposing corporate criminal liability, the deterrent value of a criminal
236
As I suggest
penalty may carry more weight than a civil penalty.
237
above, criminal penalties are different in kind than civil penalties.
They cannot be dismissed as a mere cost of doing business because
they impose reputational damage in addition to financial conse238
While some scholars dispute whether the possibility of
quences.
239
reputational damage is a deterrent, my experience in corporate
plea negotiations for many years at the Justice Department suggests
that companies care about the reputational harm of a criminal conviction. Criminal penalties also carry collateral consequences, such as
240
the loss of government contracting, that make criminal sanctions a
better deterrent than otherwise comparable civil penalties.

234. On the overcriminalization debate, see Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 712 (2005) (advocating against overcriminalization); Paul S.
Rosenzweig, The Overcriminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, The Heritage
Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 7 (2003) (same); cf. John L. Diamond, The Myth of
Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111 (1996) (arguing in
support of the expansion of so-called ‘regulatory offenses’); Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a
Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997) (arguing that a misunderstanding of the role of morality
in the criminal law has led to “miscalculation of the extent to which overcriminalization is
a problem”).
235. See MSHA REPORT, supra note 1.
236. Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra note 32, at 1448–52. But see Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 833–67 (1994).
237. See supra text accompanying note 32.
238. Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions, supra note 135, at 1850–51 n.296–99.
239. Khanna, supra note 224, at 1499.
240. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2006) (prohibiting federal contracting with any person convicted under the Clean Water Act “until the [EPA] Administrator certifies that the
condition give rise to such conviction has been corrected”).

1336

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1295

Perhaps most significantly of all, criminal prosecution has an expressive function that cannot be achieved by non-criminal disposi241
Criminal prosecution has a stigmatizing effect that civil ention.
242
forcement does not. “Criminal law is ultimately different from tort
and other civil law, not because it demands more culpability but be243
cause of the condemnation it imposes on the transgressors.” When
we criminalize conduct, we make clear that it is outside the bounds of
244
While some civil penalties can
acceptable conduct in our society.
have the same effect, there is a qualitative difference in labeling con245
duct criminal.
If the prosecution of corporate crime serves retributive, utilitarian, and expressive purposes, it follows that the failure to prosecute
criminally by entering deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements will diminish those effects. We achieve less in terms of
punishment and deterrence when we enter deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements. We fail to express societal condemnation when we agree that charges will be dismissed or not brought at
all. Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution minimize criminal
conduct and may risk condoning it. As Professor Kahan has explained, “when society deliberately foregoes answering the wrongdoer
through punishment, it risks being perceived as endorsing his valua246
tions [and thus his misconduct].”
Nor is it sufficient to say that we will rely on the criminal prosecution of individuals to punish and deter wrongdoing. In far too many
cases of corporate wrongdoing, it is not possible to identify senior level management who are criminally liable. In some cases, the individuals involved are at such low levels and have received such poor training that prosecution of individuals is not appropriate. Even in cases
where there are individual defendants, we send a mixed message societally when we say that the individuals have acted criminally but the
corporation that benefited from their misconduct did not. Yet that is
exactly the message we send with deferred prosecution agreements
and even more so with non-prosecution agreements.

241. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, reprinted in DOING AND
DESERVING 95–118 (1970).
242. See Khanna, supra note 224, at 1499.
243. John L. Diamond, The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 IND. L. REV. 291, 311 (1998).
244. Id.
245. Id. As Professor Diamond explained, “What is criminally wrong and right must be
something more than what it is merely civilly wrong and right.” Id. at 309.
246. Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598
(1996).

2013]

EROSION OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

1337

B. The Justice Department Is Contravening Its Policies by Entering
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements
The frequent use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements over the last decade cannot be reconciled with Justice
Department policies governing criminal prosecution. As Part I of this
Article notes, deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
surged after the Thompson Memo was issued in 2003 based on a reference to pretrial diversion in the section on cooperation. Yet, neither the Department’s policies on pretrial diversion nor its policies on
cooperation justify the extensive use of deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements that ensued after 2003.
Pretrial diversion always has been limited to individuals with little
or no history of misconduct and to crimes that were less serious. The
Justice Department’s policies on pretrial diversion are set by each
United States Attorney’s office but uniformly hold that pretrial diversion is not available for repeat offenders who commit serious crimes.
Yet, the Justice Department has entered deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements with corporations that had a history of
serious violations and committed egregious crimes.
The Upper Big Branch mining disaster may be the best example
of how far the Justice Department has strayed from the pretrial diversion model. Massey had a terrible history of environmental and
worker safety violations. The company already had been criminally
prosecuted at another facility. On that basis alone, Massey’s conduct
should not have qualified for deferred prosecution or nonprosecution. Moreover, Massey’s crimes resulted in the deaths of
twenty-nine miners. Even without a history of violations, Massey’s
conduct was too egregious for deferred prosecution or non247
prosecution.
Another example of the misuse of deferred prosecution is the
HSBC case. In announcing its deferred prosecution agreement with
HSBC, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division stated, “HSBC is being held accountable for stunning failures of oversight—and worse—that led the bank to permit narcotics traffickers
and others to launder hundreds of millions of dollars through HSBC
subsidiaries, and to facilitate hundreds of millions more in transac248
The government never would
tions with sanctioned countries.”

247. See USAM § 9-22.100 (limiting diversion to individuals with little or no criminal
records); see also supra Part I.A.
248. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA
N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in
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have agreed to pretrial diversion for individuals involved in such
egregious misconduct, yet it was willing to enter a deferred prosecution agreement with HSBC. With money laundering claims that totaled nearly a trillion dollars, it is difficult to understand how anything
less than a criminal prosecution would provide the accountability
249
touted by the Criminal Division.
Nor are the Massey and HSBC cases outliers. Other deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements have been entered in
cases involving millions of dollars in fraud, securities violations, and
other egregious misconduct that never would qualify for pretrial diversion. Indeed, it is hard to discern any limits on what crimes would
be eligible for deferred prosecution or non-prosecution, at least in
cases brought by the Criminal Division, which contorts the pretrial diversion model.
The Justice Department’s policies on non-prosecution in exchange for cooperation also have been honored in the breach in the
rush to enter deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.
The Thompson Memo notes that the United States Attorney Manual
allows prosecutors to enter “a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for cooperation when a corporation’s ‘timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be
250
A closer examination of these requirements shows how
effective.’”
far the Department has strayed from its policies regarding cooperation.
First, the United States Attorneys’ Manual expresses a strong
preference for obtaining cooperation by entering plea agreements
that involve either a reduction in charges or sentencing considera251
tion. These alternatives are described as “clearly preferable to permitting an offender to avoid any liability for [its] conduct,” and prosecutors are advised that “the possible use of an alternative to a nonprosecution agreement should be given serious consideration in the
252
In other words, non-prosecution only occurs if cofirst instance.”

Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/
Garrett/prosecution_agreements/press_release/HSBC.pdf.
249. But see United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161,
at *13–20 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (approving the HSBC deferred prosecution agreement
despite “heavy public criticism” and stating that the “decision to approve the DPA is easy,
for it accomplishes a great deal”).
250. Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at 6 (citing USAM § 9-27.600).
251. USAM § 9-27.600.
252. Id.
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operation cannot be obtained through a plea agreement or an alternative that preserves the Department’s ability to prosecute criminally.
Of course, it is not possible for us to know what steps the Justice
Department took to secure cooperation in the nearly 300 cases it has
resolved by deferred prosecution or non-prosecution. Given how frequently other parts of the Department obtain cooperation using plea
agreements, however, it is likely that the Department is not limiting
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution to cases where it cannot
obtain cooperation by other means. Rather, it seems apparent that
the Department is electing to enter deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements whenever it opportunistically chooses to
forego criminal prosecution, not because it must to obtain cooperation.
Second, the United States Attorney’s Manual describes the balancing that prosecutors must do if they “conclude[] that a nonprosecution agreement would be the only effective method for ob253
Prosecutors are advised to consider the cost
taining cooperation.”
of foregoing prosecution against the benefit of cooperation and de254
The
termine whether non-prosecution is in the public interest.
public interest test requires weighing (1) the importance of the case;
(2) the value of the cooperation; and (3) the relative culpability and
255
In this regard, the Justice Decriminal history of the defendant.
partment policies are different than its pretrial diversion policies, inasmuch as non-prosecution only is allowed in “cases in which the co256
operation sought concerns the commission of a serious offense.”
Significantly, however, the Department makes clear that “[s]ince the
primary function of a Federal prosecutor is to enforce the criminal
law, he[] should not routinely or indiscriminately enter into nonprosecution agreements, which are, in essence, agreements not to en257
force the law under particular conditions.”
By 2008, the Justice Department had shifted its rationale for deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreement to the avoidance
258
The Department provided little guidof collateral consequences.
ance about how that decision should be made other than to state tautologically that “the appropriateness of a criminal charge against a
corporation, or some lesser alternative, must be evaluated in a prag253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

USAM § 9-27.600.
Id. § 9-27.620.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 108.
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matic and reasoned way that produces a fair outcome, taking into
consideration, among other things, the Department’s need to pro259
mote and ensure respect for the law.” The blanket authorization to
enter “fair” deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
with corporations stands in stark contrast to the Department’s restrictive approach to non-prosecution in all other contexts.
Moreover, the Justice Department’s reliance on collateral consequences as a justification for deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements is inconsistent with the Department’s policies
260
on nolo contendere or “no contest” pleas. For decades, the Justice
Department has opposed efforts by defendants to enter no contest
pleas, which corporations sought both as a way to limit their admissions about criminal conduct and to avoid the collateral estoppel effect of guilty pleas in parallel civil litigation. The Department requires prosecutors to “oppose the acceptance of a plea nolo
contendere unless the Assistant Attorney General with supervisory responsibility over the subject matter concludes that the circumstances
of the case are so unusual that acceptance of such a plea would be in
261
The United States Attorney’s Manual quotes
the public interest.”
former Attorney General Herbert Brownwell, Jr., who stated:
One of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for
Federal law enforcement in recent times has been the practice of permitting as a matter of course in many criminal indictments the plea of nolo contendere. While it may serve a
legitimate purpose in a few extraordinary situations and
where civil litigation is also pending, I can see no justification for it as an everyday practice, particularly where it is
used to avoid certain indirect consequences of pleading
262
guilty.
Attorney General Brownwell’s concerns about the use of no contest
pleas as a matter of course—and his view that they should not as part
of “everyday practice” be used as a vehicle for avoiding the collateral
consequences of pleading guilty—would appear to apply with equal
or greater force to the more favorable outcome of deferred prosecution or non-prosecution.
It is revealing that the Justice Department continues to vehemently oppose no contest pleas—which at least result in a criminal
259. USAM § 9-28.1000.
260. Compare USAM § 9-27.520 (discussing the strict prosecutorial policies on nolo contendere), with id. § 9-28.1000 (allowing prosecutors to consider collateral consequences
when dealing with corporate criminal liability).
261. Id. § 9-27.500.
262. Id.
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conviction—but routinely allows companies to enter deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. In the past, to avoid entering a guilty plea for criminal violations, a corporation would have to
convince the Department that it was the extraordinary situation where
a no contest plea should be authorized by an Assistant Attorney General. Today, the same corporation can obtain an even better outcome
with little or no showing of extraordinary circumstances and no requirement of Assistant Attorney General approval.
C. Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Distorts the Role of the
Criminal Prosecutor
As the preceding Sections demonstrate, the frequent use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements is not consistent
with the theoretical purposes of corporate criminal prosecution or
the Justice Department’s policies. In addition, the use of such agreements distorts the role of the criminal prosecutor, makes it appear
that companies can buy their way out of criminal prosecution, and reveals ambivalence in the government’s approach to prosecuting corporate crime.
Prosecutors regularly exercise discretion about which violations
warrant criminal prosecution and which should be declined. There
may be no more essential role for prosecutors than the fair exercise of
discretion to decide which criminal violations warrant criminal prosecution and the possible imposition of criminal sanctions, if the defendant is found guilty. It would be difficult to overstate the power
conferred on prosecutors when they decide whether to bring criminal
charges, since a mere accusation can have devastating effects on the
defendant, even if the case goes to trial and the defendant is acquit263
ted.
We can and should expect prosecutors to exercise sound judgment in the threshold decision about whether a particular violation of
the law warrants criminal prosecution. If, in accordance with the
264
Principles of Federal Prosecution, the prosecutor determines that a
case warrants prosecution, charges should be brought. If she determines the case does not justify criminal prosecution, the case should
be declined. The choice is fundamental to the fair administration of
our criminal justice system. There should be no middle ground between criminal prosecution and declination, unless to serve some de263. Cf. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588
(discussing how it is improper for prosecutors to bring charges against the innocent or
those who they know will be acquitted).
264. USAM § 9-27.000.
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fined and limited purpose like rehabilitation of first-time offenders
who commit non-serious crimes or when necessary to obtain essential
cooperation. It may be appropriate to also allow deferred prosecution or non-prosecution in exceptional cases like WakeMed, where
the government was able to demonstrate that innocent third parties
265
But those cases, like instances
would suffer unacceptable harm.
warranting no contest pleas, should occur rarely and only with Assistant Attorney General approval.
The government erodes corporate criminality by using deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements as a substitute for criminal prosecution. When a prosecutor concludes that the conduct involved is too egregious to decline criminal charges—that the conduct
must be addressed in the criminal justice system—the prosecutor
should seek criminal charges. The decision to pursue a non-criminal
alternative betrays the prosecutor’s determination about the inherent
wrongfulness and criminality of the defendant’s conduct. Worse, it
creates the appearance that a corporate defendant can “undo” the
criminal nature of its conduct if the company offers attractive enough
terms to entice the government to agree to a deferred prosecution or
non-prosecution.
Conversely, the government misuses its criminal enforcement authority by entering deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements as a substitute for declination. When a prosecutor concludes
that criminal prosecution is unwarranted—that criminal charges and
criminal sanctions are too severe—the prosecutor should decline
criminal charges. Under these circumstances, negotiating the terms
of a non-criminal disposition is an abuse of prosecutorial authority.
In effect, the prosecutor is leveraging the threat of criminal charges
that she believes should not be brought to coerce the defendant into
entering a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement. Just
as prosecutors who have decided to decline should not use the threat
266
of criminal prosecution to obtain civil settlements, it is inappropriate for the government to use the threat of criminal prosecution to
obtain a deferred or non-prosecution agreement, when the prosecutor does not intend to prosecute.
It could be argued that prosecutorial discretion does not involve
such a binary set of choices between prosecution and declination. After all, prosecutors regularly exercise discretion over which charges to
265. See supra text accompanying note 169.
266. See, e.g., ENRD DIRECTIVE 0802: PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS POLICY 8 (2008) (“Criminal prosecution shall not be used as a threat to obtain civil settlement.”).
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pursue. Prosecutors properly offer defendants the opportunity to
plead guilty to lesser charges than might be pursued at trial. In still
other circumstances, prosecutors may decide that conduct, while
criminal, is not serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution. But
even in these scenarios, prosecutors are making a fundamental choice
about whether the conduct will be handled criminally.
It also merits emphasis that much corporate crime occurs in the
regulatory context or involves conduct like fraud where civil remedies
also are available to the government. In those cases, the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution is a particularly egregious
distortion of the role of the criminal prosecutor. For most regulatory
violations, the government has a range of enforcement options that
267
include criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement. If a particular violation does not warrant criminal enforcement—in other words
when it is not necessary to impose a criminal punishment or label the
underlying conduct as criminal—the government can and should use
civil or administrative enforcement to impose penalties and any corrective actions. There is no evidence that the government requires a
fourth option in addition to those it already possesses. Nor is there
any indication that Congress intended to provide for more than criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement for regulatory violations
(although some regulatory schemes offer only civil or administrative
enforcement as alternatives to criminal prosecution, not both).
Ultimately, what may be most disconcerting about the Justice
Department’s approach to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements is its willingness to consider non-criminal resolutions even
in egregious cases of corporate crime. When the most serious criminal violations can be handled outside the criminal justice system—
cases involving deaths and double-sets of books or hundreds of millions of dollars in fraud claims—it raises questions about the Department’s commitment to prosecuting corporate crime. And in the process, the concept of corporate criminality is eroded and the rule of
law is weakened.
The Justice Department still prosecutes corporate crime. It does
so because corporate wrongdoing can have devastating effects that
warrant punishment under retributive and utilitarian theories. It
prosecutes criminally because labels matter, and we communicate far
more about our condemnation of wrongdoing when we call conduct

267. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)-(c) (2006) (allowing the government to pursue administrative, civil, or criminal enforcement for violations of the Clean Water Act).
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criminal, whether the defendant is a corporation or an individual.
As a law enforcement institution, the Justice Department does not believe that criminal prosecution of corporations serves no purpose. So
it is all the more curious that the Department is pursuing such an
ambivalent approach to corporate prosecution: extolling its virtues
and essential role in upholding the rule of law when it prosecutes; indulging a results-oriented, ends-justify-the-means approach that discounts the criminal sanction when it does not.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Justice Department can and should be expected to make
principled decisions about whether criminal prosecution of corporations is warranted. If the law and the facts justify prosecution, charges
should be brought; they should not be sacrificed in favor of deferred
prosecution or non-prosecution. If the conduct does not rise to the
level that warrants criminal prosecution, the matter should be declined. Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, if
they occur at all, should be limited to relatively minor cases where civil or administrative enforcement is not available or the exceptional
case where other non-criminal alternatives are inadequate. Noncriminal alternatives should never be allowed in egregious cases like
the Upper Big Branch mining disaster, unless there is insufficient evidence to support criminal prosecution.
The Justice Department should amend its corporate prosecution
policies to make clear when deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements may be considered, as well as the categories
of criminal activity that cannot be resolved by such agreements. The
Assistant Attorney General approval requirements that govern no
contest pleas also should apply to deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements. By developing guidelines that curtail the
overuse of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements,
the Justice Department will ensure a principled and consistent approach to the prosecution of corporations, uphold the rule of law,
and restore confidence in the Department’s efforts to combat corporate crime.

268. See Diamond, supra note 243, at 311 (discussing how criminalizing certain conduct
clearly marks it as outside the boundaries of acceptable behavior).

